Developing economies have found it hard to use natural resource wealth to improve their economic performance. Utilising resource endowments is a multi-stage economic and political problem that requires private investment to discover and extract the resource, fiscal regimes to capture revenue, judicious spending and investment decisions, and policies to manage volatility and mitigate adverse impacts on the rest of the economy. Experience is mixed, with some successes (such as Botswana and Malaysia) and more failures. This paper reviews the challenges that are faced in successfully managing resource wealth, the evidence on country performance, and the reasons for disappointing results.
Introduction
Using natural resources to promote economic development sounds straightforward. A country has sub-soil assets such as hydro-carbons and minerals which it seeks to transform into surface assets-human and physical capital-that can be used to support employment and generate economic growth. Such assets should be particularly valuable for capital-scarce developing countries, especially as revenues from their sale accrue largely in foreign exchange and can supplement the otherwise limited fiscal capacity of their governments.
In practice, this transformation has proved hard and few developing economies have been successful. Economic growth has generally been lower in resource rich developing countries than in those without resources. It was not until the 2000s (a period of rising commodity prices) that resource rich countries grew faster, although even then per capita growth was similar in both groups of countries (IMF 2012b) . The term 'resource curse' was coined (Auty 1993 ) to capture the under-performance of resource rich economies, drawing attention to the weak performance of Bolivia, Nigeria and Venezuela, amongst others.
Successful use of non-renewable natural resources involves multiple stages. Resource deposits have to be discovered and developed. If and when this is done, resource revenues are divided between investors, government and other claimants. How are the terms of this division decided, and how are such revenues utilised by the recipients? There is likely to be intense pressure for current spending rather than investment in productive assets. Investment in the domestic economy needs to be directed to high social return projects, but these may be difficult to identify and to implement. Placing the revenues in offshore funds may be appropriate for capital-rich economies, but does little to boost economic development in a capital-poor country.
Ultimately, it is the private sector that will create the sustainable jobs and economic growth, so resource management has to be done in a manner that will support private sector investments.
But, even if revenues are effectively utilized, resource exports can appreciate the exchange rate and prove damaging to other tradable sectors of the economy -the "Dutch disease". An economy with substantial exports of natural resources can become overly dependent on a single volatile source of income, and this volatility can destabilize the macro-economy.
Subsoil assets are property of the state in almost all countries except the United States.
Thus, to navigate these multiple stages successfully, governments in resource-rich countries need to be well-intentioned, far-sighted, and highly capable. Yet many resource-rich economies have weak governance that can be further undermined by the political forces that are unleashed with the prospect of resource wealth.
The multi-stage nature of the challenge means that no single answer can be given to the question posed in the title. While some countries have succeeded in using natural resources for development, others have failed, each in their own way. This paper discusses the challenges posed by each of these stages, the evidence on country performance, and some particular country examples. We start by outlining the scale of the issue and the main facts about resource-rich low-income countries. Following sections then turn to each of the main stages: the upstream issue of attracting investment in the resource sector and securing a flow of resource income; the economics and politics of managing revenue from natural resources; and the wider impact of substantial natural resource exports on the structure and diversification of the economy. Lessons in all of these areas, along with the future prospects for resource-rich low-income countries, can be drawn both from resource-rich countries that have succeeded in building on their resource base and from those which have not.
Facts
The IMF classifies 51 countries, home to 1.4 billion people, as "resource-rich." This classification is based on a country deriving at least 20 percent of exports or 20 percent of fiscal revenue from non-renewable natural resources (based on 2006-10 averages as explained in IMF 2012b). In 25 of these countries resources make up more than three-quarters of exports, and in 20 of them resources provide more than half of government revenues. The upper middle income resource-rich economies are a mixed group, including countries from Latin America (like Chile and Venezuela), central Asia (Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan), and Africa (Libya and Algeria). The high-income resource-rich economies are mainly Middle Eastern oil exporters, along with Norway and Trinidad and Tobago. Of the twelve "prospectively" resource-rich countries, with new discoveries that are yet to be fully developed, nine are in Africa.
Our focus is on low-and lower-middle-income resource rich countries. There are 29 such countries, and these are listed in Table 1 . For this group there are four key facts. First, for many of these countries there is extreme dependence on natural resources for fiscal revenues, export sales, or both. Figure 1 plots the fiscal and export dependency of the 24 of these countries for which reliable data are available. Ten of them receive more than half of fiscal revenue from resources, and in 18 resources constitute more than two-thirds of their exports. Fiscal dependency is particularly acute for oil producers. Second, saving in these low-income resource-rich economies has generally been low. This is illustrated in Figure 2 , showing the relationship between resource rents and adjusted net savings, both expressed as a percentage share of GDP, for a set of 28 middle and low income resource-rich countries. Resource rents are measured by the World Bank in its World Development Indicators as gross revenues from oil, natural gas, coal, minerals and forests minus their estimated extraction costs. Adjusted net savings are national savings plus education expenditure and minus depletion of natural resources (World Bank 2011). As is apparent, this measure of adjusted national saving is strongly negative for a large number of resource-rich lowincome economies, and there is a negative correlation between resource rents and the savings rate.
Third, the growth performance of all the resource-rich economies as a group has been generally poor, although a few countries have done well-for example, Botswana, Malaysia, and
Chile. This cross-country finding has been extensively researched following the seminal work of Sachs and Warner (2000) who found (after controlling for initial income per capita, investments in physical and human capital, trade openness and rule of law) that natural resource dependence had a significant negative effect on the growth of GDP per capita, with a 10 percentage point increase in the ratio of resource exports to GDP depressing average growth by 0.77-1.1 percentage points per annum. Important later contributions include Mehlum et al. (2006) who interact resource abundance with institutional quality and find the negative effect of resourcerichness on growth to be present (and larger) only for countries with poor institutional quality, the break-even point being around the institutional quality of Botswana . More recent work has looked at some other dimensions of the connection from natural resource wealth to growth. For example, sub-national evidence finds that the local impact of extraction has positive effects (Cust and Poelhekke 2015) , but of rent distribution negative (Caselli and Michaels 2013 ). An extensive review of this literature which also discusses the endogeneity issues associated with different measures of resource abundance is found in Smith (2015) .
Looking just at developing countries, there has been a recent improvement in the relative performance of resource-rich economies, with average per capita growth rates of resource rich developing economies equalling those of non-resource rich in the 2000s, after being 1 percent per year lower in the 1990s. Of course, much of the earlier 2000s was also a time of booming oil and commodity prices and of rising resource trade with China, so this remains a very modest growth performance. As Ross (2012) wrote of resource rich economies' growth performance:
he real problem is not that growth ... has been slow when it should have been normal, but that it has been normal when it should have been faster than normal."
Fourth, resource revenues can be highly volatile. Some variability is largely predictable -due to opening of new fields and closure of depleted ones -but much is unpredictable, largely due to the volatility of commodity prices, particularly that of oil. There is a large literature on the measurement and causes of commodity price instability (see for example Arezki et al. 2014) , and our concern is principally its impact on resource producers. The scale of the issue is vividly illustrated by the fact the World Bank's measure of resource rents, for the world as a whole, has fluctuated at between 1½ percent (1998) and 7 percent (2008) of world GDP over the last 20 years. Amongst resource rich developing economies, measures of volatility (for example, the coefficient of variation of export revenues) typically exceed those of non-resource rich countries by 50 percent for mineral-rich countries and more than 100 percent for oil-rich countries.
Smoothing is made difficult by the long cycle of many commodity prices (particularly oil, elevated in the periods 1974-85 and 2003-2014 and with long periods of lower, but still variable, prices in between). Volatility of fiscal revenues is transmitted into even greater volatility of government spending as a consequence of pro-cyclical public spending (IMF 2012a,b) . A study by van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) decomposes the effect of resource dependence on growth into a direct and a volatility effect, finding that the direct effect is positive but often dominated by the negative indirect effect through volatility.
Discovery, Development, and Rent Capture
Prerequisites for using natural resources to promote economic development are their discovery, investment in the mines or wells necessary for their extraction, and securing the subsequent flow of income. These upstream stages of resource management are complex, and the resource endowments of many developing countries remain under-explored and under-exploited.
Initial discovery and development of a natural resource deposit requires investment by firms with considerable technical expertise. In developing countries, these firms are generally foreign owned. Economic principles suggest that the host country -owner of the resourceshould put in place a regulatory and fiscal regime in which the investor can make a normal rate of return, and rents over and above this rate are then captured by the resource owner, the state.
The regime has a number of elements. Exploration and development licenses generally carry a fee, often determined by auctioning of the rights. Subsequent resource extraction is taxed through a combination of royalties on output, production-sharing agreements in which a certain fraction of production is taken by the government directly, and through corporate income tax, possibly at a rate specific to the extractive sector. Practise varies widely between countries. A straightforward example is the sale of US oil and gas exploration and development rights on the Investors bid a production share and other terms with, for example, one particular winning bid giving government 88% of gross revenue; government paying 88% of operating costs and lower shares of exploration and development costs; and, once cost recovery is complete, the company's profits on the remaining 12% being subject to a tax rate rising from 10% to 50% (Cramton 2010) .
Even this quick sketch of the regulatory and tax problem suggests a number of complicating factors that can deter investors and depress the revenues that can be captured by the state. First is the process through which licenses are allocated. Ideally, this should be through an auction process that is transparent, competitive, and can secure a high fraction of the rent for the state. Auctions are not appropriate in all cases, for example where there is a single dominant bidder. Thus, rather than using an auction Botswana negotiated rights to diamond extraction with dominant player De Beers. The use of auctions is now widespread (particularly for oil, less so for hard-rock minerals), but there are many instances of rights having been awarded in ways that are non-transparent, possibly corrupt, and not ending up with the best qualified investor. A recent example surrounds the Simandou iron-ore project in Guinea (Economist 2014 ).
Second, investments in discovery and extraction of non-renewable resources are inherently risky due to geological and price uncertainty. Investors are further deterred by uncertainty surrounding the local economic, institutional and political environment. The regulatory environment may be cumbersome and unpredictable. Weak infrastructure may increase extraction costs. Security may be a concern, and the resource itself may be subject to theft. In Nigeria theft of crude oil (known as "bunkering") is estimated to run at 10-15 percent of total production (Katsouris and Sayne 2013, Council on Foreign Relations 2015). Theft also occurs through corruption in award of contracts, as in the Petrobras scandal (Economist 2015) .
Added to this, investors may be deterred by risk of hold-up. Investments are sunk and long-lived and governments, present and future, will have an incentive to change contractual and fiscal terms once the investment is in place. At the extreme, this is expropriation risk, but there is a broader risk of changes in rates of taxation and tax allowances. This incentive is countered by reputational risk that the government faces if it expects to develop future fields and, in some cases by a variety of legal mechanisms. Bilateral investment treaties offer investors protection against breach of contract. Where these do not exist, countries can offer contract specific stabilisation agreements that guarantee terms (or equivalent value), the credibility of which can be reinforced by offering international arbitration and waiving sovereign immunity. Some of these agreements have been breached (see the Zambian example that follows) but legal remedy has rarely been sought by investors, since this is a path that would severely damage the investor's relationship with the host country. Nevertheless, they are judged to have offered some security to investors, principally by steering countries that have experienced changed circumstance towards contract renegotiation rather than unilateral action (Daniel and Sunley 2010) .
Other inefficiencies arise in the regime for taxing output. Ideally, this should tax rents, leaving marginal extraction decisions unaffected. However, investors can disguise profits by accounting practises such as transfer mis-pricing (of inputs and, for specialty minerals, also of outputs). A response is to tax observable outputs, i.e. use royalties and production sharing agreements, even though these are inefficient since they distort investment and extraction decisions (Mullins 2010) . The tax regime also determines the time profile of revenues and risk sharing between government and investors. Government impatience and risk aversion militate towards royalties and production sharing agreements rather than pure profits tax.
What are the implications of these difficulties in the relationship between investor and host country? In some cases, government "take" (that is, the share of revenues) has been exceptionally low. An example is the Zambian copper industry which, following an unsuccessful privatization, was resold with a fiscal regime that was equivalent to an effective royalty rate of 0.6 percent, one-tenth that of comparable mining projects (Adam and Simpasa 2011) . (These fiscal terms turned out to be unsustainable and were revised in 2008, breaching fiscal stability assurances; no action was brought against the government, see Daniel and Sunley 2010 ).
Response to low take -or more generally, to the dominant role of foreign investors -has led to "resource nationalism," including the development of national resource companies to work with, or in some cases to take-over, foreign investors. In the oil sector, the formation of such national oil companies occurred largely in the 1970s, and they now control 90% of world oil reserves and over 70% of production. The experience of these companies has been mixed. Some of them have attained world class efficiency levels, like Saudi-Aramco and Petronas of Malaysia.
Others have failed to provide effective management, in some cases leading to dramatic declines in output, like the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and Zambian Consolidated Copper
Mines. Macpherson (2010) details further country experience.
The more widespread problem has not been that of low government take, but of a failure to undertake exploration and the follow-up investments at all. The deterrent effect of weak institutions is studied by Cust and Harding (2014) who look at investment in areas with similar geology on either side of an international border. They find that lower institutional quality (a one standard deviation reduction in the political rights index produced by Freedom House) halves the number of wells drilled. A sharp example is the Albert Graben geological basin between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where all exploration (and substantial discoveries)
has been on the Ugandan side. The scale of the problem is indicated by Collier (2007) who estimates that the value of subsoil assets per square kilometre in Africa is just one-quarter of those remaining in OECD countries, which seems mostly likely to be a consequence of lack of exploration, rather than resource-barren geology.
Managing Revenues
Despite these difficulties, many countries derive a high share of fiscal revenues from the natural resource sector (as shown earlier in Figure 1 ). What principles should guide the use of such revenues, how well have those principles been followed in practice, and why the divergence between principles and practices?
Principles
There are three key questions about the use of rents from extraction of non-renewable resources: 1) Should the use of these resources be focused on current consumption or investment? 2) For the investment component, what financial, physical capital, and human capital assets should be acquired? 3) Should the rents be handled by the government directly or handed to citizens? I address each of these questions in turn.
efficient path of investment needs to take into account domestic opportunities and the absorptive capacity of the economy.
While the priority is domestic investment, there are several reasons for supporting this with some accumulation of foreign assets. One is that the efficient path of domestic investment will, quite generally, be different from the actual path of revenue, often building up more slowly and being less volatile. This suggests the need for a "parking fund"; that is, a way of placing revenues offshore until they can be used efficiently in the domestic economy. Another reason is the need to self-insure against price uncertainty by building a "stabilisation fund". Some insurance against price fluctuations can be provided by financial instruments. Much oil is sold forward -that is, a price is agreed upon in the present at which the oil will be sold in the future, typically at durations up to 6 months. Mexico goes further, purchasing options (in 2015, spending more than $1 bn to guarantee a 2016 price of least $49 a barrel on 212 bn barrels of oil). However, these financial instruments are relatively short run, so do not provide protection against the long swings of resource prices. Depositing revenues in a stabilisation fund when prices are high is a way of building such a protective buffer.
Concerning the issue of who makes these consumption and investment decisions, the broad distinction is between government and the private sector. Government, while distributing some revenues through current spending, can retain ownership of assets that are acquired. These may be public investments, or assets associated with lending to the private sector, perhaps through a development bank or simply by having lower government (domestic) debt than would otherwise have been the case. The alternative is that funds are given to the private sector by tax reductions or a programme of citizen dividends. An example is the US state of Alaska, where fossil fuel revenues are placed in a fund, income from which is paid directly to citizens through the Permanent Fund Dividend Program.
The case for government control is derived from the scarcity of public funds in developing countries and the need to increase public investment in human and infrastructure capital. Resource revenues can fund such investments without imposing taxes that will be distortionary and can be hard to administer in low-income countries. Furthermore, government can smooth spending, both across generations and also in response to short-run business cycle fluctuations, mitigating the risk of resource-induced macro-economic instability. The potential benefits of distribution to the private sector are based largely on the poor track record of governments. Direct distribution to citizens may reduce the risk of corruption and improve the quality of investments undertaken, although the link from citizen dividends to efficient investment is questionable in a country with poorly developed financial institutions. Citizen dividend schemes also create their own political risks, as they may become highly politicised and subject to electoral bidding wars by populist politicians (Gupta et al. 2014 ).
Outcomes
If these are the principles, then how and why do the actual outcomes differ?
On the basic question of whether a significant proportion of the rents from extraction of non-renewable resources are being saved, Figure 2 earlier showed that savings rates (in any form, domestic investment or foreign funds) have generally been low for low-income resource- A more subtle issue arises with the interaction between public saving and private sector behaviour. At least some fraction of public sector saving will be perceived to ultimately accrue to the private sector -leading to expectations of lower future taxes or higher pensions, for example-which can lead to changes in private sector behaviour that may undermine government policy. In Kazakhstan the government acted prudently, saving around one-third of oil revenue in a sovereign wealth fund. But the private sector ran up foreign debt of a similar magnitude, leading to a severe crash in 2007-08 (Esanov and Kuralbeyeva 2011 ). It appears that foreign borrowing by Kazakhstan's banking sector was facilitated by the perceived collateral of sovereign assets.
Causes
These examples illustrate what has gone wrong with the management of revenues from extraction of natural resources, but why have matters so often gone so wrong? Part of the answer lies in technical difficulty; coping with massive fluctuations in export earnings or with private credit booms is challenging for any government. Part is due to weak governance which has, in some cases, been further damaged by the presence of resource revenues. Here, I will focus on issues of fiscal discipline, patronage politics, and the situations in which resource revenues inflame conflict-up to and including civil war.
Many resource-rich countries have found it difficult to maintain fiscal discipline in the face of competing claims for a share of resource revenues. The literature has approached this problem in various ways, the simplest of which is a model in which groups are powerful enough to obtain public spending for their projects even though the projects yield low social returns (Velasco 1999; Tornell and Lane 1999) . The groups might include spending ministries, regional governors or city mayors, all of whom have with legitimate claims on public funds. After all, it is the job of cabinet ministers or subnational government agencies to make a case for additional funding for their own departments or areas. However, since the tax base is shared while benefits of these projects accrue disproportionately to members of a particular group, each will overbid for funds, even if they recognize that their own projects have low returns and displace higher return commonly owned public assets.
The problem is exacerbated by weak government capacity. Limited capacity to appraise and implement projects means that, the larger are revenues, the greater the proportion of bad projects that get accepted. Limited capacity to police spending means that as revenues increase, corruption increases more than proportionately; the positive relationship between resource abundance and levels of corruption is established in a number of studies (for example, Ades and Di Tella 1999; Leite and Weidman 1999) . More broadly, resource revenues enable government to postpone economic reforms. Normally, if a government embarks upon an economic strategy which imposes large costs across its economy, change will eventually be forced upon the government by the decline of revenue. However, resource rents provide a cushion. Chauvet and Collier (2008) find that resource rents significantly reduce the speed of exit from dysfunctional policies, as measured by a low score on the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) indicator.
How might these failures of fiscal discipline be countered? Managing expectations can help. There is usually little public or even official knowledge of the actual scale of resource revenues, and there is often a tendency to over-estimate wealth and ignore trade-offs. Combine these factors with individuals' uncertainty about how or when they might see benefits, and it is unsurprising that inefficient transfer mechanisms -such as fuel subsidies -become extremely hard to reverse. The implication is that transparency is important, so that revenue flows and spending are visible to parliament and civil society.
A centralised system of financial control and authority can help with fiscal discipline, too. In principle, a central finance ministry can balance the competing demands of spending ministries, regional authorities, or other lobby groups. However, to play this role effectively the finance ministry must have control of incoming revenues, along with sufficient political will and power to resist competing demands. Botswana has had a powerful Ministry of Finance and Development Planning that has controlled and prioritised spending. It recognised that, particularly after its diamond discoveries, the main constraint was not finance but implementation capacity. Foreign expertise was brought into the ministry to support implementation of rigorous project appraisal and cost-benefit analyses of public spending (Criscuolo, Criscuolo and Palmade 2008) . In many other countries control is diffuse, often with national resource companies engaging in off-budget quasi-fiscal activities, such as running fuel subsidy or even social welfare programs. An extreme example is Venezuela where, in the mid-2000s, the national oil company PDVSA was spending 40% more on social programs than on its oil and gas operations (MacPherson 2010).
The hand of the finance ministry can be strengthened by a 'fiscal constitution' that imposes ceilings on public spending from resource revenues or public funds more generally (Poterba and Von Haagen 1999; Primo 2007) . Many resource rich countries have put fiscal rules in place, assigning shares of resource revenue to different funds, some domestic and some offshore. Experience is country-specific, but overall an IMF study concluded that there is no evidence that fiscal rules have had an effect on fiscal outcomes (Ossowski et al. 2008) . Amongst resource rich countries Chile's fiscal constitution has been largely successful (Frankel 2011) . Spending pressures are magnified by the prevalence of patronage politics, which distorts public spending to favour partisan groups. This distortion can have an intertemporal dimension, with the current government spending heavily on its favoured group, and passing on too little capital (or too high levels of debt) to the next government (Alesina and Tabellini 1990; Alesina and Drazen 1991) . Revenues can be used by the incumbent government to increase the probability of staying in power. For example, the government can initiate spending which it can credibly commit to continue if it wins the election, but which the opposition party would cancel.
Ghana established funds in its Petroleum
Public sector employment in which the government hires its supporters is a good example.
Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2005, 2006) show that it is possible that a substantial fraction of resource revenues are dissipated this way and, if public employment is of lower social value than the alternative, real income can be reduced by a resource windfall.
Resource politics plays out in democracies, and also enables autocrats to remain in power. Ross (2012) shows that the democratic transitions that affected many countries in the 1980s and 1990s left most oil states untouched, a finding that is not due to simply to the high incidence of autocracy in the Middle East.
Wealth from natural resources can also increase conflict risk. As case studies (Klare, 2001 ) and statistical analyses (Fearon and Laitin 2003; show, it can provide both the motive and the means for insurgency, while also providing funds for the government (or those with access to government funds) to equip itself to retain power. Besley and Persson (2008) find that an increase in commodity prices (a measure of resource revenues exogenous to each country) significantly increases the incidence of conflict. Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom (2004) investigate the duration of civil wars and find that a price increase of the commodities that a country exports significantly reduces the chance that a war will be settled. Dube and Vargas (2013) add an interesting twist: using regional data for Colombia, they find that higher oil prices increased conflict while increases in coffee prices have the opposite effect, possibly by increasing the value of devoting labor time to coffee production.
While actual conflict can be devastating, the threat of conflict also matters in many situations where conflict does not actually occur. Resource rents alter the leader's probability of staying in power, and hence the economic, political and military strategies that are pursued (Caselli and Cunningham 2009) . This is evident in the responses of countries to the threat of conflict. In Malaysia, past experience of ethnic conflict led government to commit to inclusive growth (discussed further in the following section). In Nigeria, the experience of Biafra's attempted secession in 1967 led the country to fracture into 36 separate states. Each is militarily incapable of seceding from the 35 others but, by reducing central authority, the fracture has also diminished the effectiveness of resource governance-for example, limiting the implementation of the national Fiscal Responsibility Act.
Natural Resources and Economic Structure

Dutch Disease
Resource revenues change the structure of the economy, particularly in countries where they constitute a share of exports at the levels indicated in Figure 1 . Other tradable activities will be displaced, partly as factors of production are drawn into resource extraction, and partly as they are employed to meet increased demand for non-tradables arising from domestic spending of resource revenues (Corden and Neary 1982) . This phenomenon was christened the 'Dutch disease' following the experience of Holland with development and export of its natural gas.
This changing structure of the economy has a counterpart in the balance of payments as higher resource exports lead to some combination of higher imports or lower non-resource exports together with (depending on elasticities) an appreciation of the real exchange rate.
Empirical work establishes the presence of these effects. Adverse effects on nonresource tradable sectors are documented for many countries-for example, the collapse of Nigerian agriculture (Ross 2012) -and cross-country empirical work confirms that resource exports are associated with smaller tradable goods sectors. Brahmbhatt et al. (2010) find that countries in which the resource sector accounts for more than 30 percent of GDP have a nonresource tradable sector 15 percentage points lower than the norm, while Ismail (2010) finds that a 10 percent increase in a measure of oil revenues is associated with an average 3.4 percent fall in value added across manufacturing.
In itself, structural change in an economy is not necessarily a problem, but it can have a negative impact on real income if it interacts with market failures. In particular, if the nonresource tradable sector has increasing returns (either static, or as a result of dynamic learningby-doing), then the effect may be to reduce the level and growth of real income (Torvik 2001; Krugman 1987; Sachs and Warner 1997) How can these adverse effects be avoided? One route is economic management to mitigate effects, and another is pro-active policy to grow other sectors of the economy. We discuss each in turn.
Mitigation
Whether a resource driven spending boom displaces other economic activity or expands activity as a whole depends on the supply response of the economy. An economy in which labor is fully employed is likely to experience a contraction of its non-resource tradable sector as employment shifts to meet expanding demand for non-tradables. However, in a developing country with a substantial quantity of un-(or under-)employed labour, booming demand for nontradables can draw labour into employment. This mitigates the Dutch disease and, with this increase in employment and income, the balance of payments will adjust to higher resource exports less by a reduction in non-resource exports and more by drawing in additional imports.
This mitigation is more likely to work if two conditions are met. First, the economy has to be flexible and not encounter other supply bottlenecks. This means openness to trade, ease of entry of new firms, labor market flexibility, and ease of migration to urban centres. Potential bottlenecks -such as in urban and transport infrastructure, power supply, and the labour skillsneed to be identified and addressed in the early stages of a resource boom, measures referred to by Collier (2010) as 'investing-in-investing'. Second, since these adjustments necessarily take time, spending should not ramp up too rapidly, suggesting use of a 'parking fund' as discussed above.
A further issue arises as some economic variables may adjust faster than othersespecially the exchange rate. In a flexible exchange rate regime expectations may cause early appreciation, the exchange rate jumping up at the date of resource discovery and possibly before significant spending effects are felt. The decline of tradable sectors may then precede the expansion of non-tradable sectors creating recession, at least in areas of the economy not directly experiencing resource related activity. An example is Zambia in the period 2005-6 which experienced capital inflow due to a high nominal return on government debt and a high copper price, leading to abrupt appreciation and damage to non-resource exports (Adam and Simposa 2011) . This was also part of the UK's experience with North Sea oil (Eastwood and Venables 1982) . At a cross-country level, the empirical work of Arezki et al. (2015) , studying the effect of giant oil discoveries, finds that the discoveries alone have an initial negative effect on employment, investment and GDP. The response to these expectations driven changes is monetary and exchange rate policy that moderates upwards pressure on the exchange rate.
In summary, mitigating adverse structural change requires fiscal policies that smooth spending (and involve parking revenues offshore), microeconomic policies to increase the flexibility of the economy and anticipate bottlenecks, and monetary or exchange rate policies that control appreciation of the currency.
Diversification
The call for policies to grow non-resource sectors and thereby diversify the economy is widely heard, yet few resource rich countries have been successful. What can, and has been done? Resource revenues are a source of public funds and, as is widely recommended, these can be used to fund public investments complementary to private investment, such as investment in human capital, in public infrastructure, and possibly also in utilities. As discussed above, many resource rich economies have missed this opportunity.
Other policies can target specific sectors or firms. A frequent policy has been to promote is a wedge between the world price and the domestic price. Historical transport costs meant that 19 th -century economic development was often close to natural sources of coal and iron ore. In the modern economy, shipping costs are relatively low for oil and most bulk minerals, but much higher for natural gas. While the capital costs of large scale gas developments (such as the offshore developments planned in East Africa) can be met only by the prospect of export sales, the price wedge means that some fraction of output should be used domestically, which raises the important prospect of relatively cheap electricity supply for the producing region.
Diversification strategies have also been pursued by using revenues to support investment sectors not directly linked to resources, either through development banks or direct government industrial policy. As with industrial policy in other contexts, there are numerous failures and a few successes. Malaysia offers an example of success, as does Chile. Following ethnic riots in 1969, the Malaysian government committed to using economic development to narrow racial economic inequalities (Yusof 2011) . A strong central government implemented a series of development plans, a centrepiece of which was to use resource revenues (in particular oil revenues, which grew rapidly from the mid-1970s) to diversify the economy. Within agriculture, investment programs raised productivity and implemented a transition from rubber to palm oil production. In manufacturing, the economy was open to trade and foreign direct investment, and pursued an industrial policy (including infrastructure development, particularly in special economic zones) which succeeded in developing a range of labor intensive activities including the electronics sector. Macroeconomic stability was maintained by fiscal prudence and some element of luck (as when rapidly increasing oil volumes offset the price fall of the 1980s).
Elements of Malaysia's success are due to its location in a booming region and it its commodity mix (rubber and tin as well as oil). But most importantly, the government recognized that inclusive economic growth was necessary for future stability, and government capacity was sufficient to implement this policy effectively.
Concluding Comments and Future Prospects
It is straightforward to catalog the failures of resource-rich countries. Some have failed to attract investors, and thus failed to receive much income from their deposits of non-renewable Accompanying these changes has been the increased use of "resource for infrastructure" deals, some of which are barter deals, and others part of wider trade and investment agreements (Halland et al. 2014 ). Brautigam and Gallagher (2014) estimate that, between 2000 and 2011,
China committed $80 bn of resource backed loans to Latin America and $53 bn to Africa, of which $13bn is to Angola alone. The loans to Angola principally finance infrastructure, but also include school and hospital projects. Much of the construction work is done using Chinese workers and inputs and repayments are made in oil, specified in quantity, not value terms (Cassel et al. 2010 ).
Such deals have potential benefits. They are a commitment to transform sub-soil assets into surface assets, rather than into current consumption, and to do so in a manner that is relatively rapid. However, the devil is in the details. The terms and conditions of these contracts are generally not transparent and some appear, on close investigation, to have offered poor terms to the host economy. The quality, design, and appropriateness of projects is sometimes questionable. Study of a 2008 agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo, China
Exim Bank and two Chinese construction companies, worth up to $6bn and giving copper and cobalt in return for infrastructure, points to lack of transparency and scrutiny, questionable project selection, and no process for assessing value for money (Global Witness 2011). To deliver their potential benefits, resource for infrastructure deals need to develop scrutiny procedures that ensure value is being derived.
Finally, future prospects for resource-rich economies are dominated by the commodity price fall of 2014-15, viewed by some as the end of a "super-cycle" of commodity prices (for example, Goldberg 2015; Bershidsky, 2015) . The combination of fundamental supply-side changes in energy markets (like fracking in oil markets) and the growing efforts at conserving the use of fossil fuels in response to concerns over climate change make it likely that, at least for hydro-carbons, prices will stay low. For resource-rich countries that have been accustomed to high commodity prices in the last 10-15 years, these changes are large negative shocks. Many will have to adjust to fill two gaps, one in the public finances and the other in the balance of payments. It is to be hoped that putting each on a better basis -increasing fiscal discipline and enabling a stronger non-resource export sector to drive growth -may improve the chances of benefiting from continuing, if reduced, revenues from extraction of non-renewable resources.
